Bringing Responsibility to Justice
In order to successfully introduce responsibility-sensitivity into theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived) it is not enough to merely draw distinctions between (i) different models of what responsibility-sensitivity requires in itself...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2017]
|
| In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2017, Volume: 24, Issue: 3, Pages: 363-404 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Political ethics
/ Justice
/ Sense of responsibility
|
| IxTheo Classification: | NCB Personal ethics NCD Political ethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In order to successfully introduce responsibility-sensitivity into theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived) it is not enough to merely draw distinctions between (i) different models of what responsibility-sensitivity requires in itself and (ii) different normative grounds of, or justifications for, responsibility-sensitivity. We must also draw distinctions between (iii) different roles played by responsibility-sensitivity within our theories; (iv) different accounts of the strength of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice; (v) different accounts of the strength of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of political morality; and (vi) different conceptions of the other requirements also incorporated into theories of justice and theories of political morality. The intended payoff of all this distinction-drawing is twofold: first, a more accurate, comprehensive, and illuminating account of the nature of the position of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice and theories of political morality; and, second, paving the way for a more sophisticated and analytically sharp research agenda on the subject of whether or not responsibility-sensitivity should have a position in our theories of normative political concepts in the face of mounting scepticism over its doing so, owing in part to the harshness/abandonment objection and the unfreedom objection. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1370-0049 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.24.3.3248536 |