The concept of rationality in Andrew Gleeson’s antitheodicy
Under an ‘antitheodicy’, I understand any attempt to show the principal impossibility of a morally respectable and rationally convincing theoretical answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is understood as a problem of consistency and rational coherence between propositions. In this paper, I...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Stampa Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2017]
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| In: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Anno: 2017, Volume: 78, Fascicolo: 4/5, Pagine: 511-522 |
| (sequenze di) soggetti normati: | B
Gleeson, Andrew 1957-
/ Il male
/ Teodicea
/ Razionalità
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| Notazioni IxTheo: | NBC Dio VA Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
analytic philosophy of religion
B Rationality B Antitheodicy B informal reasoning B problem of evil B Gleeson B philosophical method |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| informazioni sui diritti: | InC 1.0 |
| Riepilogo: | Under an ‘antitheodicy’, I understand any attempt to show the principal impossibility of a morally respectable and rationally convincing theoretical answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is understood as a problem of consistency and rational coherence between propositions. In this paper, I will analyse the concept of rationality which is presupposed at least in some strands of antitheodicy. A. Gleeson’s ‘A frightening love. Recasting the Problem of Evil’ presupposes a dichotomy between an engaged-existential and a detached-impersonal kind of philosophical thinking which are respectively characterized by a stress on authenticity and the acknowledgement of particularity and contingency in the first case and by precision, logic, provability and an instrumental understanding of rationality in the second case. The second kind of reasoning which underlies all theodicies is inapt for dealing adequately with the real problem of evil. I try to show that the dichotomy of impersonal objective and existentially subjective kinds of philosophy is not a contradictory one but leaves out a broad field in-between which can be characterized as ‘informal reasoning’ and which allows a morally sensitive answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is not isolated from the ‘real’ problem of evil. |
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| ISSN: | 2169-2327 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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