Defending Sufficientarianism
In the present article, I aim to defend and slightly revise the ideal of Freedom from Duress as presented by Axelsen and Nielsen. I will argue that by perceiving the two categories of capabilities as they are presented in the ideal, that is capabilities related to basic needs and capabilities relate...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
[2017]
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| In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2017, Volume: 24, Issue: 2, Pages: 181-198 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Distributive justice
/ Minimum requirements
/ Inequality
/ Freedom
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| IxTheo Classification: | NCC Social ethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In the present article, I aim to defend and slightly revise the ideal of Freedom from Duress as presented by Axelsen and Nielsen. I will argue that by perceiving the two categories of capabilities as they are presented in the ideal, that is capabilities related to basic needs and capabilities related to the fundamental interests of a human being in a social setting, as two distinct threshold-bundles, some priority between the two is possible and this hence eliminates the problem of threshold-fetishism in the ideal of Freedom from Duress. As in the original formulation of the ideal, I stand by the negative thesis in its strongest formulation, but add the distinction between justice and fairness in order to make an intuitively adequate argument against any reformulation of the negative thesis |
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| ISSN: | 1370-0049 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.24.2.3218001 |