The Storage Problem Revisited: A Reply to Díaz
Antonio Ramos Díaz has recently given an extensive critique of what I have called the "storage problem" for materialism about the human mind. I respond to Díaz, showing that his critique fails. First, I rehearse the storage problem, explaining what claims it does and does not involve. I th...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2018]
|
In: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Year: 2018, Volume: 92, Issue: 1, Pages: 97-105 |
Further subjects: | B
Philosophers
B Intellect B theory of knowledge B American Catholic Philosophical Association B Philosophy |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Antonio Ramos Díaz has recently given an extensive critique of what I have called the "storage problem" for materialism about the human mind. I respond to Díaz, showing that his critique fails. First, I rehearse the storage problem, explaining what claims it does and does not involve. I then consider Díaz's "strong" and "weak" interpretations of my argument, explaining why I do not subscribe to the strong version, which misinterprets my position, especially concerning the meaning of the term "concrete." His weak version of my argument is closer to what I intend, but Díaz's own unpacking of this interpretation also commits me to claims I do not, for very good reasons, accept. Díaz does not, in the end, show the storage problem to be--as he thinks--an unsound way of arguing for dualism. Getting concepts into a purely material human intellect still looks like the metaphysical equivalent of fitting a square peg into a round hole. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2153-8441 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpq20171127135 |