The Storage Problem Revisited: A Reply to Díaz

Antonio Ramos Díaz has recently given an extensive critique of what I have called the "storage problem" for materialism about the human mind. I respond to Díaz, showing that his critique fails. First, I rehearse the storage problem, explaining what claims it does and does not involve. I th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Oderberg, David S. 1963- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Philosophy Documentation Center [2018]
In: American catholic philosophical quarterly
Year: 2018, Volume: 92, Issue: 1, Pages: 97-105
Further subjects:B Philosophers
B Intellect
B theory of knowledge
B American Catholic Philosophical Association
B Philosophy
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:Antonio Ramos Díaz has recently given an extensive critique of what I have called the "storage problem" for materialism about the human mind. I respond to Díaz, showing that his critique fails. First, I rehearse the storage problem, explaining what claims it does and does not involve. I then consider Díaz's "strong" and "weak" interpretations of my argument, explaining why I do not subscribe to the strong version, which misinterprets my position, especially concerning the meaning of the term "concrete." His weak version of my argument is closer to what I intend, but Díaz's own unpacking of this interpretation also commits me to claims I do not, for very good reasons, accept. Díaz does not, in the end, show the storage problem to be--as he thinks--an unsound way of arguing for dualism. Getting concepts into a purely material human intellect still looks like the metaphysical equivalent of fitting a square peg into a round hole.
ISSN:2153-8441
Contains:Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.5840/acpq20171127135