Love, Freedom, and Morality in Kant and Dietrich von Hildebrand
Modern commentators like Allen Wood have noted that for Kant there "is a basic tension in human nature between loving people and respecting them." Love is a threat to pure morality insofar as love is an empirical inclination and any will determined by such an inclination is unfree. In this...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2017]
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In: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Year: 2017, Volume: 91, Issue: 4, Pages: 703-717 |
Further subjects: | B
Phenomenology
B Love B Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 B Liberty B Philosophy B Von Hildebrand, Dietrich |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Modern commentators like Allen Wood have noted that for Kant there "is a basic tension in human nature between loving people and respecting them." Love is a threat to pure morality insofar as love is an empirical inclination and any will determined by such an inclination is unfree. In this paper, I begin by exploring why Kant thinks that love is a threat to moral freedom. Drawing on the insights of Dietrich von Hildebrand, I propose instead an analysis of love as "value-response." I argue that a more complete phenomenological analysis of the nature of human affectivity (as fundamentally intentional and responsive) exposes a serious defect in Kant's moral psychology, particularly his unreasonable denial of the compatibility of higher-order affectivity and human freedom. Drawing on von Hildebrand's notion of "cooperative freedom," I argue that not only is a higher-order spiritual affectivity compatible with freedom and morality, but it is essential to it. |
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ISSN: | 2153-8441 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpq20171012131 |