A New Look at A Priori Knowledge and Hildebrand's Discovery of Different Kinds of Unities
The main thesis defended in this paper is that Hildebrand's distinction between what we could call quiddities--or "quasi-essences," endowed with chaotic and accidental unity--and genuine essences possessing an intrinsically necessary unity, grounds the radical distinction between anal...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2017]
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| In: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Year: 2017, Volume: 91, Issue: 4, Pages: 567-588 |
| Further subjects: | B
Essentialism (Philosophy)
B theory of knowledge B JUDGMENT (Psychology) B THESIS statements (Rhetoric) B Von Hildebrand, Dietrich |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | The main thesis defended in this paper is that Hildebrand's distinction between what we could call quiddities--or "quasi-essences," endowed with chaotic and accidental unity--and genuine essences possessing an intrinsically necessary unity, grounds the radical distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge. This thesis has not been expressly emphasized by Hildebrand himself. In order to prove it, we: (1) relate the three types of unities distinguished by Hildebrand with the three kinds of judgments discriminated by Kant; (2) outline what we can call the "crux of empiricism"; (3) analyze four characteristic examples of synthetic a priori judgements; and (4) elaborate a provisional typology of synthetic a priori propositions, trying to include in it Hildebrand's favorite examples. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-8441 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpq20171012132 |