Is a Thomistic Teory of Intentionality Consistent with Physicalism?
I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosoph...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2017]
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| Em: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Ano: 2017, Volume: 91, Número: 1, Páginas: 1-28 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
KING, Peter
B Logical Positivism B Intentionality (Philosophy) B PASNAU, Robert B Naturalistic Fallacy |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Resumo: | I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosophy of nature, I develop a Tomistic theory of intentionality that supports a certain kind of anti-physicalism. I then consider criticisms of the Tomistic theory of intentionality raised by Peter King and Robert Pasnau. In reply I argue that (a) King's position would have the Scholastics adopt an approach to intentionality that fails to solve the very problem such a theory is supposed to address; and (b) contrary to Pasnau's objection, there are ample resources available to show that the Tomist does not commit a content fallacy. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-8441 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpq20161212104 |
