Augustine's Metaphysics and Free Will
Free Will is not a problem which can simply be answered. The long history surrounding this issue would seem to indicate that. It is not that an answer is impossible; on the contrary, the problem is that many answers may be given and no single one can be established to the exclusion of all others....
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[1967]
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In: |
Harvard theological review
Year: 1967, Volume: 60, Issue: 3, Pages: 297-306 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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Summary: | Free Will is not a problem which can simply be answered. The long history surrounding this issue would seem to indicate that. It is not that an answer is impossible; on the contrary, the problem is that many answers may be given and no single one can be established to the exclusion of all others. Which answer is adopted depends upon one's metaphysics, upon one's basic assumptions about the first principles which govern and structure the world. Does all this leave us lost in a helpless pluralism where freedom of the will is concerned, an issue which might well be the crucial problem of our own era and which certainly has been important in every philosophical age? No, not unless we adopt an attitude of scepticism where metaphysics is concerned. Thus, our success in dealing with free will depends upon our metaphysical competence. If we can analyze previous metaphysical views and then construct and defend our own, we can still structure an answer to the issue of freedom of the will. |
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ISSN: | 1475-4517 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Harvard theological review
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0017816000003783 |