Stroud, Hegel, Heidegger: A Transcendental Argument
This paper presents an original, ambitious, truth-directed transcendental argument for the existence of an ‘external world’. It begins with a double-headed starting-point: Stroud’s own remarks on the necessary conditions of language in general, and Hegel’s critique of the “fear of error.” The paper...
| Τόπος έκδοσης: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
|---|---|
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2018
|
| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Έτος: 2018, Τόμος: 8, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 167-191 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1770-1831
/ Heidegger, Martin 1889-1976
/ Stroud, Barry 1935-2019
/ Υπέρβαση (μοτίβο)
/ Ύπαρξη (μοτίβο)
B Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1770-1831 / Heidegger, Martin 1889-1976 / Stroud, Barry 1935-2019 / Υπέρβαση (μοτίβο) / Ύπαρξη (μοτίβο) / Εξωτερικός κόσμος |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Transcendental Argument
external world
Stroud
Hegel
Heidegger
necessary conditions of the possibility of language
necessary conditions of the possibility of error
|
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | This paper presents an original, ambitious, truth-directed transcendental argument for the existence of an ‘external world’. It begins with a double-headed starting-point: Stroud’s own remarks on the necessary conditions of language in general, and Hegel’s critique of the “fear of error.” The paper argues that the sceptical challenge requires a particular critical concept of thought as that which may diverge from reality, and that this concept is possible only through reflection on situations of error, in which how things are thought (or experienced) to be diverges from how things really are with independent items in an objective world. The existence of such a world is therefore a necessary condition of the possibility of scepticism: such scepticism is therefore false. I defend the argument against objections from Stroud’s sceptic and others. Drawing on Heidegger, the paper concludes by indicating that the chain of necessary conditions includes practical engagement with the world. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20171282 |