Stephen Davis's objection to the second ontological argument
Stephen Davis has argued that the second ontological argument (OA) fails as a theistic proof because it ignores the logical possibility of what he calls an ontologically impossible being. By an 'ontologically impossible being' (OIB) he means a being that (a) does not exist, (b) logically-p...
| Published in: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
|
| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Further subjects: | B
Second ontological argument
B Ontologically impossible being (OIB) B Necessary being B Predicate (Logic) B Religion Philosophy B Stephen Davis B God Proof, Ontological B Possibility B Logic |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Stephen Davis has argued that the second ontological argument (OA) fails as a theistic proof because it ignores the logical possibility of what he calls an ontologically impossible being. By an 'ontologically impossible being' (OIB) he means a being that (a) does not exist, (b) logically-possibly exists, and (c) would exist necessarily if it existed. In this brief essay, I argue, first, that even if an OIB is logically possible, its logical possibility is irrelevant to the OA at issue; and second, that an OIB is in fact logically impossible, because the predicates which define it are inconsistent. The concept of an OIB may be coherent if necessity is understood as ontological self-sufficiency, but even so the OIB is irrelevant to the OA. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9511-8 |