Reliance and its Obligations
This article presents a principle identifying a form of internally conditional moral obligation concerning reliance. The need for internal conditionality arises from the generality of the concept of reliance, together with the thesis that obligated' implies can'. The principle's con...
| Published in: | Ethical perspectives |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Peeters
[2018]
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| In: |
Ethical perspectives
|
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Trust
/ Duty
|
| IxTheo Classification: | NCB Personal ethics XA Law |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | This article presents a principle identifying a form of internally conditional moral obligation concerning reliance. The need for internal conditionality arises from the generality of the concept of reliance, together with the thesis that obligated' implies can'. The principle's conditions include matters upstream from the reliant action (e.g. its being intentionally caused), downstream (harm), and concomitant with it (e.g. the absence of certain adversarial relationships). An epistemic condition straddles those categories. The principle is defended against objections, including the claims that it breaks the link between obligation and action and that reliance is normatively redundant. The principle may be derived from various moral theories, possibly via intermediate principles about harm, respect for autonomy, and the promotion of cooperation. Contrasts are drawn between moral and legal reliance-related obligations. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.25.1.3284671 |