The Problem of Alternative Monotheisms: Another Serious Challenge to Theism
Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms.[1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods....
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2018]
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| Em: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2018, Volume: 10, Número: 1, Páginas: 31-51 |
| (Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Monoteísmo
/ Divindades
/ Teísmo
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| Classificações IxTheo: | AB Filosofia da religião NCB Ética individual |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Theism
B argument from alternative monotheisms B The Evil God Challenge B quasi-deism B Deism |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Resumo: | Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms.[1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods. We find that theistic philosophers have not successfully eliminated these and other possibilities, or argued for their relative improbability. In fact, based on current evidence - especially concerning the hiddenness of God and the gratuitous evils in the world - many of these hypotheses appear to be more probable than theism. Also considering the - arguably infinite - number of alternative monotheisms, the inescapable conclusion is that theism is a very improbable god-concept, even when it is assumed that one and only one transcendent god exists.[1] I take theism' to mean classical theism', which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, I wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for theism over monotheistic alternatives. I consider theism and alternative monotheisms as entailing the notion of divine transcendence. |
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| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v10i1.1801 |
