Naturalism, theism, and multiply realizable mental states
Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should b...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2018]
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2018, Volume: 54, Issue: 1, Pages: 91-105 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Theism
/ Naturalism (Philosophy)
/ God
/ Mentaler Zustand
/ Brain
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AE Psychology of religion NBC Doctrine of God |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Paul Draper has argued that the scientific evidence for the dependence of mental states upon brain states provides a good reason for thinking that theism is very probably false because the extreme metaphysical dualism implied by theism makes it antecedently likely, if God exists, that minds should be fundamentally non-physical entities. However, Draper's argument assumes that what makes God's mind a mind is the immaterial stuff it is made of. But that assumption is potentially faulty. Why? Because, if functionalism is true, then all conceivable minds are fundamentally functional entities identified by what they do, rather than by what they are made of. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412516000421 |