How not to defend Positive Evidential Atheism

In ‘Undermining the case for evidential atheism', Religious Studies, 48 (2012), 83-93, I challenged positive evidential atheism on the basis of some considerations from divine hiding, if God exists. Scott Aikin, in ‘Does divine hiding undermine Positive Evidential Atheism?', Religious Stud...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Moser, Paul K. 1957- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Cambridge Univ. Press [2017]
In: Religious studies
Year: 2017, Volume: 53, Issue: 4, Pages: 459-465
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Atheism controversy / Proof of God's existence
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:In ‘Undermining the case for evidential atheism', Religious Studies, 48 (2012), 83-93, I challenged positive evidential atheism on the basis of some considerations from divine hiding, if God exists. Scott Aikin, in ‘Does divine hiding undermine Positive Evidential Atheism?', Religious Studies, 52 (2016), 205-212, attempts to rehabilitate positive evidential atheism in the face of my challenge. I contend that his attempt fails, owing not only to his misunderstanding of my challenge from divine hiding but to also his defective positive case for atheism. The main defect is in his portrait of how evidence would count against God's reality. I explain how a serious epistemic problem for evidential atheism persists, relative to available relevant evidence, despite Aikin's proposed defence.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contains:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412516000251