The incarnation, soul-free: physicalism, kind membership, and the incarnation

Animalists, those who hold that human persons are identical to human animals, seem committed to holding that, in becoming incarnate, the Son of God became a human animal. Unsurprisingly, a number of philosophers have argued that this is impossible. In this article, I consider several objections to a...

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主要作者: Sharpe, Kevin W. (Author)
格式: 電子 Article
語言:English
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
出版: [2017]
In: Religious studies
Year: 2017, 卷: 53, 發布: 1, Pages: 117-131
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B / 物理主義 / 動物 / Inkarnation Jesu
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
NBF Christology
在線閱讀: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
實物特徵
總結:Animalists, those who hold that human persons are identical to human animals, seem committed to holding that, in becoming incarnate, the Son of God became a human animal. Unsurprisingly, a number of philosophers have argued that this is impossible. In this article, I consider several objections to an animalist account of the incarnation based on kind membership, viz. objections drawing on kind essentialism, constitution essentialism, and the persistence conditions of animals. After developing each objection in detail, I respond by drawing on my preferred formulation of animalism. My goal in addressing these objections is to take the first steps toward demonstrating the compatibility of animalism and the incarnation.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contains:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000530