The incarnation, soul-free: physicalism, kind membership, and the incarnation
Animalists, those who hold that human persons are identical to human animals, seem committed to holding that, in becoming incarnate, the Son of God became a human animal. Unsurprisingly, a number of philosophers have argued that this is impossible. In this article, I consider several objections to a...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2017]
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2017, 卷: 53, 發布: 1, Pages: 117-131 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
人
/ 物理主義
/ 動物
/ Inkarnation Jesu
|
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBF Christology |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| 總結: | Animalists, those who hold that human persons are identical to human animals, seem committed to holding that, in becoming incarnate, the Son of God became a human animal. Unsurprisingly, a number of philosophers have argued that this is impossible. In this article, I consider several objections to an animalist account of the incarnation based on kind membership, viz. objections drawing on kind essentialism, constitution essentialism, and the persistence conditions of animals. After developing each objection in detail, I respond by drawing on my preferred formulation of animalism. My goal in addressing these objections is to take the first steps toward demonstrating the compatibility of animalism and the incarnation. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000530 |