The power of humility in sceptical religion: why Ietsism is preferable to J. L. Schellenberg's Ultimism
J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2017]
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| Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 2017, Volume: 53, Numéro: 1, Pages: 97-116 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-
/ Scepticisme
/ Être suprême
/ Humilité
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| Classifications IxTheo: | AB Philosophie de la religion |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Maison d'édition) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism - the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously - is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000475 |
