The power of humility in sceptical religion: why Ietsism is preferable to J. L. Schellenberg's Ultimism
J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 載入...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2017]
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2017, 卷: 53, 發布: 1, Pages: 97-116 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-
/ 懷疑主義
/ 最高存有
/ 謙卑
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| 總結: | J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism - the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously - is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000475 |
