The power of humility in sceptical religion: why Ietsism is preferable to J. L. Schellenberg's Ultimism

J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Elliott, J. K. 1943-2024 (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press [2017]
In: Religious studies
Year: 2017, Volume: 53, Issue: 1, Pages: 97-116
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Schellenberg, J. L. 1959- / Scepticism / Supreme Being / Humility
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
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Summary:J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism - the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously - is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism.
ISSN:1469-901X
Contains:Enthalten in: Religious studies
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000475