The power of humility in sceptical religion: why Ietsism is preferable to J. L. Schellenberg's Ultimism
J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2017]
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In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2017, Volume: 53, Issue: 1, Pages: 97-116 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-
/ Scepticism
/ Supreme Being
/ Humility
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IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism - the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously - is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism. |
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ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000475 |