Augustine on will, freedom, and foreknowledge: De libero arbitrio, III, 1-3
Towards the beginning of the third book of De libero arbitrio, Augustine defends the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. His defence appears to involve the idea that the will is essentially free. I discuss and evaluate Augustine's reasons for thinking that the will is essen...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2016]
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| Dans: |
Religious studies
Année: 2016, Volume: 52, Numéro: 3, Pages: 315-332 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Augustinus, Aurelius, Saint 354-430, De libero arbitrio. 3
/ Libre arbitre
/ Préscience
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| Classifications IxTheo: | KAB Christianisme primitif |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Maison d'édition) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Towards the beginning of the third book of De libero arbitrio, Augustine defends the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. His defence appears to involve the idea that the will is essentially free. I discuss and evaluate Augustine's reasons for thinking that the will is essentially free, and the way that Augustine moves from the essential freedom of the will to the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000165 |
