Luther's necessitarian argument in De servo arbitrio
In De servo arbitrio (1525) Luther famously argues that the divine attributes of will, power, foreknowledge, and immutability are incompatible with (human) free will, and hence that free will is a name with no reality'. I survey some earlier explications of Luther's argument in the litera...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Опубликовано: |
[2016]
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В: |
Religious studies
Год: 2016, Том: 52, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 81-95 |
Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Luther, Martin 1483-1546, De servo arbitrio
B Свобода воли |
Индексация IxTheo: | KDD Евангелическая церковь NBA Догматика |
Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
Итог: | In De servo arbitrio (1525) Luther famously argues that the divine attributes of will, power, foreknowledge, and immutability are incompatible with (human) free will, and hence that free will is a name with no reality'. I survey some earlier explications of Luther's argument in the literature, and reject them as exegetically unsound. I then go on to propose a new explication. On the proposed explication, Luther's argument turns out to be theologically cogent, provided that we follow Luther in understanding the relevant divine attributes in accordance with Augustinian theology. |
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ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412514000572 |