Luther's necessitarian argument in De servo arbitrio
In De servo arbitrio (1525) Luther famously argues that the divine attributes of will, power, foreknowledge, and immutability are incompatible with (human) free will, and hence that free will is a name with no reality'. I survey some earlier explications of Luther's argument in the litera...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
[2016]
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Στο/Στη: |
Religious studies
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 52, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 81-95 |
Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Luther, Martin 1483-1546, De servo arbitrio
B Ελεύθερη βούληση <μοτίβο> |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | KDD Ευαγγελική Εκκλησία NBA Δογματική |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
Σύνοψη: | In De servo arbitrio (1525) Luther famously argues that the divine attributes of will, power, foreknowledge, and immutability are incompatible with (human) free will, and hence that free will is a name with no reality'. I survey some earlier explications of Luther's argument in the literature, and reject them as exegetically unsound. I then go on to propose a new explication. On the proposed explication, Luther's argument turns out to be theologically cogent, provided that we follow Luther in understanding the relevant divine attributes in accordance with Augustinian theology. |
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ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412514000572 |