Luther's necessitarian argument in De servo arbitrio
In De servo arbitrio (1525) Luther famously argues that the divine attributes of will, power, foreknowledge, and immutability are incompatible with (human) free will, and hence that free will is a name with no reality'. I survey some earlier explications of Luther's argument in the litera...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado: |
[2016]
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En: |
Religious studies
Año: 2016, Volumen: 52, Número: 1, Páginas: 81-95 |
(Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Luther, Martin 1483-1546, De servo arbitrio
B Libre albedrío |
Clasificaciones IxTheo: | KDD Iglesia evangélica NBA Dogmática |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
Sumario: | In De servo arbitrio (1525) Luther famously argues that the divine attributes of will, power, foreknowledge, and immutability are incompatible with (human) free will, and hence that free will is a name with no reality'. I survey some earlier explications of Luther's argument in the literature, and reject them as exegetically unsound. I then go on to propose a new explication. On the proposed explication, Luther's argument turns out to be theologically cogent, provided that we follow Luther in understanding the relevant divine attributes in accordance with Augustinian theology. |
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ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412514000572 |