Ordinary morality does not imply atheism
Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these argum...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2018]
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| В: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Год: 2018, Том: 83, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 85-96 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Мораль (мотив)
/ Страдание
/ Моральное доказательство существования Бога
/ Атеизм (мотив)
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| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Atheism
B Morality B Evil B Theodicy B Stephen Maitzen B God |
| Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9589-7 |