Methodological naturalism and its misconceptions
Methodological naturalism has been defended on both intrinsic and pragmatic grounds. Both of these defenses agree that methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which the scientist ought to eschew talk of causally efficacious disembodied minds. I argue that this is the wrong i...
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2017]
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2017, 卷: 82, 发布: 3, Pages: 321-336 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
自然主义 (哲学)
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| Further subjects: | B
Creationism
B Empiricism B RELIGION & science B Faith B Religious Aspects B Naturalism B Methodological Naturalism |
| 在线阅读: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 总结: | Methodological naturalism has been defended on both intrinsic and pragmatic grounds. Both of these defenses agree that methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which the scientist ought to eschew talk of causally efficacious disembodied minds. I argue that this is the wrong interpretation of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism does not constrain the theories that scientists may conjecture, but how those theories may be justified. On this view, methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which supernatural methods of justification, such as faith, are eschewed. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-017-9616-3 |