The Trolley's Last Stop before Consequentialism: Exploring the Terrain
The doctrine of double effect and the many other principles that philosophers have advanced to remedy the doctrine's defects were meant, in the words of Warren Quinn, "to capture certain kinds of fairly common intuitions about [a set of canonical] pairs of cases." Both cases in each...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado: |
[2017]
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En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2017, Volumen: 20, Número: 5, Páginas: 1021-1035 |
Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCA Ética VA Filosofía |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Deontology
B Trolley Problem B Moral intuitions B Consequentialism |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
Sumario: | The doctrine of double effect and the many other principles that philosophers have advanced to remedy the doctrine's defects were meant, in the words of Warren Quinn, "to capture certain kinds of fairly common intuitions about [a set of canonical] pairs of cases." Both cases in each pair have the same consequential profile, in that "agents bring about the same good result at the same cost in lives lost or harm suffered." But they exhibit differing deontological characteristics, leading the common intuitions to which Quinn refers to deem one but not the other case in each pair permissible. Over time, though, the body of cases has ballooned to embrace ever more complex situations about which intuitions are far less shared, and the principles advanced to explain those intuitions do not necessarily generate the common permissible/impermissible distinctions in each canonical pair. My goal is to offer a principle that does so, and to suggest that it reflects a unique deontology. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9841-y |