Divine Motivation Theory and Exemplarism
In this paper I summarize two versions of a new form of ethical theory in which all basic moral terms are defined by direct reference to exemplars of goodness. I call the Christian form Divine Motivation Theory in a book by the same name (Cambridge University Press, 2004), and the more general form...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2016]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, Volume: 8, Issue: 3, Pages: 109-121 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Theological ethics
/ The Good
/ Philosophy
/ Virtue ethics
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCB Personal ethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In this paper I summarize two versions of a new form of ethical theory in which all basic moral terms are defined by direct reference to exemplars of goodness. I call the Christian form Divine Motivation Theory in a book by the same name (Cambridge University Press, 2004), and the more general form I call Exemplarist Virtue Theory (Gifford Lectures 2015) or Exemplarist Moral Theory (forthcoming 2017, Oxford University Press). In the Christian form the supreme exemplar is God. In exemplarist virtue theory exemplars are superbly admirable persons or fictional characters, whose goodness is identified through the emotion of admiration rather than through the satisfaction of descriptive properties. In both versions of the theory the terms good person, virtue, good life, admirable act, and right act are defined by the acts, motives, judgments, and attitudes of exemplary persons. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1689 |