An Inconsistency in Craig's Defence of the Moral Argument
I argue that William Craigs defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate ac...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2012]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2012, Volume: 4, Numéro: 4, Pages: 49-58 |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
