An Inconsistency in Craig's Defence of the Moral Argument
I argue that William Craigs defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate ac...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2012]
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In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 4, Issue: 4, Pages: 49-58 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |