Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency
In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that Gods agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and t...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2015]
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| Em: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2015, Volume: 7, Número: 3, Páginas: 67-78 |
| (Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Deus
/ Trama
/ Livre arbítrio
/ Determinismo
|
| Classificações IxTheo: | AB Filosofia da religião NBC Deus |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Resumo: | In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that Gods agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and then consider how to respond to it from the point of view of my own position, which I call Agency Incompatibilism. I argue that a crucial premise in the argument is ambiguous and offer responses to the argument on behalf of the Agency Incompatibilist, on each of the two disambiguations. |
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| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.105 |
