Secondary-Cause Autonomy and Divine Motivation
An act-theoretical view on the profile of responsibility discourse shows in what sense not only all kinds of technical, pragmatic and moral reason, but also all kinds of religious motivation cannot justify a human action sufficiently without acknowledgment to three basic principles of human autonomy...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2016]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, Volume: 8, Issue: 3, Pages: 75-92 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Action theory
/ God
/ Freedom of action
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCB Personal ethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | An act-theoretical view on the profile of responsibility discourse shows in what sense not only all kinds of technical, pragmatic and moral reason, but also all kinds of religious motivation cannot justify a human action sufficiently without acknowledgment to three basic principles of human autonomy as supreme limiting conditions that are human dignity, sense, and justifiability. According to Thomas Aquinas human beings ultimately owe their moral autonomy to a divine creator. So this autonomy can be considered as an expression of secondary-cause autonomy and as the voice of God in the enlightened conscience. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1687 |