Wittgenstein and the 'Factorization Model' of Religious Belief

In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a ‘f...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schönbaumsfeld, Genia 1973- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2014]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 6, Issue: 1, Pages: 93-110
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951 / Religious philosophy / Faith content / Faith act
IxTheo Classification:AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism
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Summary:In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a ‘factorization model’ which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent ‘factors’ - the belief’s content and the belief-attitude - appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a ‘factorization model’ severely distorts Wittgenstein’s conception of religious belief.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.193