The Epistemology of Modest Atheism
Distinguishing between the old atheism, the new atheism, and modest atheism, and also between belief and acceptance, and belief and acceptance tokens and types, I defend the disjunctive view that either modest atheistic belief or modest atheistic acceptance, construed as type, is today epistemically...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2015]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, Volume: 7, Issue: 1, Pages: 51-69 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Mackie, John L. 1917-1981, The miracle of theism
/ Dawkins, Richard 1941-, The God delusion
/ Atheism
/ Epistemic modal logic
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Distinguishing between the old atheism, the new atheism, and modest atheism, and also between belief and acceptance, and belief and acceptance tokens and types, I defend the disjunctive view that either modest atheistic belief or modest atheistic acceptance, construed as type, is today epistemically justified in the context of philosophical inquiry. Central to my defence is a deductive version of the hiddenness argument and an emphasis on the early stage of philosophical inquiry that we presently occupy. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i1.129 |