Could God Fail to Exist?
I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Humes conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments,...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2016]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2016, Volume: 8, Numéro: 3, Pages: 159-177 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Hume, David 1711-1776
/ Swinburne, Richard 1934-
/ Question de l’existence de Dieu
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| Classifications IxTheo: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Humes conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments, including Swinburnes neo-Humean argument and the subtraction argument. I show that such arguments face a parity problem, since the very reasoning that gets them off the ground also launches parallel arguments for an opposite conclusion. In my closing section, I sketch an argument schema designed to illustrate a new, general strategy for deducing the necessary existence of God by building upon recent modal cosmological arguments. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1692 |