Could God Fail to Exist?
I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Humes conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments,...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2016]
|
| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, Volume: 8, Issue: 3, Pages: 159-177 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Hume, David 1711-1776
/ Swinburne, Richard 1934-
/ Existence of God
|
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Humes conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments, including Swinburnes neo-Humean argument and the subtraction argument. I show that such arguments face a parity problem, since the very reasoning that gets them off the ground also launches parallel arguments for an opposite conclusion. In my closing section, I sketch an argument schema designed to illustrate a new, general strategy for deducing the necessary existence of God by building upon recent modal cosmological arguments. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1692 |