Could God Fail to Exist?
I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Humes conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments,...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado: |
[2016]
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En: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2016, Volumen: 8, Número: 3, Páginas: 159-177 |
(Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Hume, David 1711-1776
/ Swinburne, Richard 1934-
/ Cuestión de la existencia de Dios
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Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión NBC Dios |
Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Sumario: | I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Humes conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments, including Swinburnes neo-Humean argument and the subtraction argument. I show that such arguments face a parity problem, since the very reasoning that gets them off the ground also launches parallel arguments for an opposite conclusion. In my closing section, I sketch an argument schema designed to illustrate a new, general strategy for deducing the necessary existence of God by building upon recent modal cosmological arguments. |
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Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1692 |