Could God Fail to Exist?

I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Hume’s conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Rasmussen, Joshua (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado: [2016]
En: European journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2016, Volumen: 8, Número: 3, Páginas: 159-177
(Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar:B Hume, David 1711-1776 / Swinburne, Richard 1934- / Cuestión de la existencia de Dios
Clasificaciones IxTheo:AB Filosofía de la religión
NBC Dios
Acceso en línea: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)
Descripción
Sumario:I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Hume’s conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments, including Swinburne’s neo-Humean argument and the subtraction argument. I show that such arguments face a ‘parity’ problem, since the very reasoning that gets them off the ground also launches parallel arguments for an opposite conclusion. In my closing section, I sketch an argument schema designed to illustrate a new, general strategy for deducing the necessary existence of God by building upon recent modal cosmological arguments.
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1692