Could God Fail to Exist?
I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Humes conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments,...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[2016]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Jahr: 2016, Band: 8, Heft: 3, Seiten: 159-177 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Hume, David 1711-1776
/ Swinburne, Richard 1934-
/ Gottesfrage
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| IxTheo Notationen: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus NBC Gotteslehre |
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Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Zusammenfassung: | I apply developments in modal reasoning to the question of whether God has necessary existence. My larger task is to assess the main reasons to think that God is not a metaphysically necessary being. I consider Humes conceivability-based argument, and then I pay attention to more recent arguments, including Swinburnes neo-Humean argument and the subtraction argument. I show that such arguments face a parity problem, since the very reasoning that gets them off the ground also launches parallel arguments for an opposite conclusion. In my closing section, I sketch an argument schema designed to illustrate a new, general strategy for deducing the necessary existence of God by building upon recent modal cosmological arguments. |
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| Enthält: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i3.1692 |