Zagzebski on Rationality
This paper examines Linda Zagzebskis (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular,...
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado em: |
[2014]
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Em: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2014, Volume: 6, Número: 4, Páginas: 39-46 |
(Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus 1946-, Epistemic authority
/ Racionalidade
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Classificações IxTheo: | AB Filosofia da religião |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Resumo: | This paper examines Linda Zagzebskis (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebskis claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a quick way of dealing with radical scepticism, her account of rationality actually seems to be particularly vulnerable to this problem. |
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Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143 |