Zagzebski on Rationality

This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular,...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Pritchard, Duncan 1974- (Author)
Outros Autores: Ryan, Shane (Other)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado em: [2014]
Em: European journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2014, Volume: 6, Número: 4, Páginas: 39-46
(Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão:B Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus 1946-, Epistemic authority / Racionalidade
Classificações IxTheo:AB Filosofia da religião
Acesso em linha: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)
Descrição
Resumo:This paper examines Linda Zagzebski’s (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebski’s claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a quick way of dealing with radical scepticism, her account of rationality actually seems to be particularly vulnerable to this problem.
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143