Against Theological Fictionalism
According to theological fictionalism, God has the same status as a fictional character in a novel or a movie. Such a claim has been defended by Robin le Poidevin on the basis of Kendall Waltons theory of make-believe. But it is not only a philosophical esoteric account of religious beliefs, it is...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2011]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2011, Volume: 3, Issue: 2, Pages: 427-437 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | According to theological fictionalism, God has the same status as a fictional character in a novel or a movie. Such a claim has been defended by Robin le Poidevin on the basis of Kendall Waltons theory of make-believe. But it is not only a philosophical esoteric account of religious beliefs, it is now an exoteric view, sometimes accepted by believers themselves, and so could even be considered a postmodern heresy. But theological fictionalism does not work: faith is real assent and not make-believe; belief is different from acceptance; belief and faith are dispositional, but make-believe seems to presuppose an account of beliefs as occurrent states; we cannot anymore imagine at will than we can believe at will. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.404 |