Four (Or So) New Fine-Tuning Arguments
Both proponents and opponents of the argument for the deliberate fine-tuning, by an intelligent agent, of the fundamental constants of the universe have accepted certain assumptions about how the argument will go. These include both treating the fine-tuning of the constants as constitutive of the na...
| 主要作者: | |
|---|---|
| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2016]
|
| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2016, 卷: 8, 發布: 2, Pages: 85-106 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
宇宙論
/ 物理常數
/ Intelligent Design
|
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| 總結: | Both proponents and opponents of the argument for the deliberate fine-tuning, by an intelligent agent, of the fundamental constants of the universe have accepted certain assumptions about how the argument will go. These include both treating the fine-tuning of the constants as constitutive of the nature of the universe itself and conditioning on the fact that the constants actually do fall into the life-permitting range, rather than on the narrowness of the range. It is also generally assumed that the fine-tuning argument should precede biological arguments for design from, e.g., the origin of life. I suggest four new arguments, two of which are different orderings of the same data. Each of these abandons one or more of the common assumptions about how the fine-tuning argument should go, and they provide new possibilities for answering or avoiding objections to the fine-tuning argument. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.59 |