Ordinary Morality Implies Atheism

I present a “moral argument” for the non-existence of God. Theism, I argue, can’t accommodate an ordinary and fundamental moral obligation acknowledged by many people, including many theists. My argument turns on a principle that a number of philosophers already accept as a constraint on God’s treat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Maitzen, Stephen (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2009]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2009, Volume: 1, Issue: 2, Pages: 107-126
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
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Parallel Edition:Non-electronic
Description
Summary:I present a “moral argument” for the non-existence of God. Theism, I argue, can’t accommodate an ordinary and fundamental moral obligation acknowledged by many people, including many theists. My argument turns on a principle that a number of philosophers already accept as a constraint on God’s treatment of human beings. I defend the principle against objections from those inclined to reject it.
Contains:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v1i2.343