Can God's Goodness Save the Divine Command Theory from Euthyphro?
Recent defenders of the divine command theory like Adams and Alston have confronted the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing that although Gods commands make right actions right, God is morally perfect and hence would never issue unjust or immoral commandments. On their view, Gods nature is the standard o...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2012]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 4, Issue: 1, Pages: 177-195 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Recent defenders of the divine command theory like Adams and Alston have confronted the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing that although Gods commands make right actions right, God is morally perfect and hence would never issue unjust or immoral commandments. On their view, Gods nature is the standard of moral goodness, and Gods commands are the source of all obligation. I argue that this view of divine goodness fails because it strips Gods nature of any features that would make His goodness intelligible. An adequate solution to the Euthyphro dilemma may require that God be constrained by a standard of goodness that is external to Himself - itself a problematic proposal for many theists. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v4i1.313 |