How Are We to Think of God's Freedom?
The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCanns, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and be...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2015]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2015, Volume: 7, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 49-65 |
| (sequenze di) soggetti normati: | B
Dio
/ Libero arbitrio
/ Libertà
|
| Notazioni IxTheo: | AB Filosofia delle religioni NBC Dio |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Riepilogo: | The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCanns, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and benefits, a more traditional account of Gods freedom, in which he possesses vestigial alternativity, the freedom to choose an alternative should there have been a sufficient reason to do so. |
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| Comprende: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.104 |
