Zagzebski, Authority, and Faith
Epistemic Authority is a mature work of a leading epistemologist and philosopher of religion (and metaphysician, too, but that character doesnt feature in this story). It is a work primarily in epistemology with applications to religious epistemology. There are obvious applications of the notion of...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
[2014]
|
| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 6, Issue: 4, Pages: 47-59 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus 1946-, Epistemic authority
/ Authority
/ Faith
|
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Epistemic Authority is a mature work of a leading epistemologist and philosopher of religion (and metaphysician, too, but that character doesnt feature in this story). It is a work primarily in epistemology with applications to religious epistemology. There are obvious applications of the notion of epistemic authority to philosophy of religion. For, on the face of it, the notion of some kind of epistemic authority may serve as a conceptual anchor for our understanding of faith. Indeed, there is ample historical precedent for this. Faith, says Locke, is the assent to any proposition ... upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. 1 In later Lockeans, credit is often rendered authority, and the terms were used synonymously at the time of his writing. 2 One of the beauties of Lockes view is its reductionism, that is, its parsimony, which is a species of elegance and therefore beauty. Zagzebskis notion is more high-octane than Lockes. In this essay I will do four things. In Section 1 I will describe two kinds or notions of authority or at least two usages of the word authority. In Section 2 I will describe Zagzebskis use of one of these notions, the non-Lockean one, to ground the reasonableness of religious belief. In Section 3 I will give four arguments against her view. In section 4 I will reply to her critique of Locke. The upshot, in my view, is that though we learn much (very much indeed) from Epistemic Authority (about both testimony in general and religious testimony in particular among many other things), a more Lockean approach to the nature of faith is still preferable. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.144 |