Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive?
In his Ontological proof, Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property f: If f is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads...
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Language: | English |
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University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2011]
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European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2011, Volume: 3, Issue: 1, Pages: 161-169 |
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520 | |a In his Ontological proof, Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property f: If f is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false. | ||
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