Moral Error Theory and the Problem of Evil
Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (non-vacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2009]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2009, Volume: 1, Issue: 2, Pages: 89-105 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (non-vacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against criticisms by Nicholas Sturgeon. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v1i2.342 |