Modified Gaunilo-Type Objections Against Modal Ontological Arguments

Modal ontological arguments are often claimed to be immune to the «perfect island» objection of Gaunilo, because necessary existence does not apply to material, contingent things. But Gaunilo’s strategy can be reformulated: we can speak of non-contingent beings, like quasi-Gods or evil God. The pape...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Chlastawa, Daniel (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2012]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 4, Issue: 2, Pages: 113-126
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic

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