Knowledge of Persons

What is knowledge of persons, and what is knowing persons like? my answer combines (a bit of) Wittgenstein’s epistemology with (a bit of) levinas’s phenomenology. It says that our knowledge of persons is a hinge proposition for us (as in: ‘I am not of the opinion that he has a soul’, PI ii, iv). And...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Chappell, Timothy (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2013]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 3-28
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)

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