Knowledge of Persons
What is knowledge of persons, and what is knowing persons like? my answer combines (a bit of) Wittgensteins epistemology with (a bit of) levinass phenomenology. It says that our knowledge of persons is a hinge proposition for us (as in: I am not of the opinion that he has a soul, PI ii, iv). And...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 3-28 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | What is knowledge of persons, and what is knowing persons like? my answer combines (a bit of) Wittgensteins epistemology with (a bit of) levinass phenomenology. It says that our knowledge of persons is a hinge proposition for us (as in: I am not of the opinion that he has a soul, PI ii, iv). And it says that what this knowledge consists in is the experience that levinas calls the face to face: direct and unmediated encounter between persons. As levinas says, for there to be persons at all there has, first, to be a relationship, language, and this same encounter: the face to face comes first, the existence of individual persons only second. I explore some consequences of this conception for how we think about personhood, and also for how we read Descartes and Augustine. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.203 |