Euthyphro's "Dilemma", Socrates' Daimonion and Plato's God
In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Platos Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Platos intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2010]
|
| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2010, Volume: 2, Issue: 1, Pages: 39-64 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In this paper I start with the familiar accusation that divine command ethics faces a «Euthyphro dilemma». By looking at what Platos Euthyphro actually says, I argue that no such argument against divine-command ethics was Platos intention, and that, in any case, no such argument is cogent. I then explore the place of divine commands and inspiration in Platos thought more generally, arguing that Plato sees an important epistemic and practical role for both. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.350 |
