Seeing People and Knowing You
This article takes up the proposal that action and expression enable perceptual knowledge of other minds, a proposal that runs counter to a tradition of thinking that other minds are special in that they are essentially unobservable. I argue that even if we accept this proposal regarding perceptual...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
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In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 55-73 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Summary: | This article takes up the proposal that action and expression enable perceptual knowledge of other minds, a proposal that runs counter to a tradition of thinking that other minds are special in that they are essentially unobservable. I argue that even if we accept this proposal regarding perceptual knowledge, there is still a difference between knowing another person and knowing other things. I articulate this difference by pointing out that I can know another person by sharing knowledge with her. Such sharing is expressed in the use of the second-person pronoun. Thus, I argue, other minds are indeed special as objects of knowledge, but not in the way the tradition has supposed. |
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Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i4.205 |