Against Miracles as Law-Violations
Miracles are commonly understood in the way David Hume defined them: as violations of the laws of nature. I argue, however, that the conjunction of Humes definition with a neo-Humean view of the laws of nature yields objectionable consequences. In particular, the two jointly imply that some miracle...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2015]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, Volume: 7, Issue: 4, Pages: 83-98 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Miracle
/ Law of nature
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Miracles are commonly understood in the way David Hume defined them: as violations of the laws of nature. I argue, however, that the conjunction of Humes definition with a neo-Humean view of the laws of nature yields objectionable consequences. In particular, the two jointly imply that some miracles are logically impossible. A better way of thinking about miracles, I suggest, is on a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. On that view, the laws of nature contain built-in ceteris paribus clauses that allow for the possibility of external influences in the natural world. Miracles, understood as instances of external, divine influence, would therefore neither violate the laws of nature nor be instances of those laws. In this respect, neo-Aristotelians have an advantage over neo-Humeans in providing a coherent account of miracles. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i4.88 |